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Abstract 
The importance and influence of spatial data has risen in all kinds of governmental 
and non-governmental processes, giving spatial data infrastructures (SDIs) a key 
role in spatial data sharing and dissemination. SDIs are nowadays challenged by 
new technologies and user demands. Proper SDI governance seems essential, 
but it is unclear to what extent current SDI governing systems are fully equipped 
to deal with the dynamics and complexity of SDIs. This research proposes a 
governing system framework for analysing the governing system of SDIs, adapted 
from the concepts of Kooiman. This framework is applied to two Dutch SDI cases: 
the Risk Map and the New Map of the Netherlands. With the help of the framework, 
the strong and weak aspects of the governing system of SDIs become more 
apparent and insights emerge on which interactions, images, instruments, actions 
and structures enable or constrain SDI governance. By observing changes in 
governing systems over time, SDI governance dynamics become visible. The 
governing system framework brings a new perspective to SDIs and SDI theory and 
is a potentially useful analytical tool for SDI governors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, governments, companies and NGOs have improved their spatial 
data management by introducing a spatial data infrastructure (SDI). Spatial data, 
also called geo-information, has become a ‘critical component’ providing 
understanding about what happens where. Integration of spatial data with 
governmental services is favourable to ‘economic growth, national security, 
sustainable social development, environmental sustainability and national 
prosperity’ (UN-GGIM, 2018, p.4). In many instances, an SDI is implemented to 
facilitate efficient spatial data sharing between organisations by diminishing data 
duplication and fragmentation of spatial information.  
Previously, ‘The principal objective of developing an SDI is to provide an 
appropriate environment in which all stakeholders, both users and producers, of 
spatial information can cooperate with each other in a cost-efficient and cost-
effective way to better achieve their targets’ (Rajabifard et al., 2002, p.13). Later 
on, this objective shifted from cost reduction to maximising benefits, by focusing 
more on the users and their needs (Rajabifard et al., 2003). With the rise of the 
internet and influence of the ‘open government’ paradigm, many governmental 
SDIs opened up and are not only focused on increasing benefits for their own 
organisation, but also for society as a whole. 
Open spatial data has resulted in growth in the use of spatial data (Hansen et al., 
2013), but it also put pressure on data business models (Welle Donker, 2009) and 
resulted in a continuously growing group of SDI stakeholders (Vancauwenberghe 
and van Loenen, 2017) with various needs and interests (Coetzee et al., 2018). 
SDIs are constantly challenged by new technologies and user demands. This is 
partly due to the complex, multi-stakeholders, multi-level, technical and open 
nature of SDIs. SDIs should therefore not be seen as stationary, but as complex 
adaptive systems that adapt and evolve over time (Grus et al., 2010; Sjoukema et 
al., 2017). A proper SDI governing system which enables SDI governance 
processes and steers SDI development in the desired direction appears essential, 
but it is unclear to what extent current SDI governing systems are fully equipped 
to deal with the dynamics and complexity of SDIs.  
In this paper, we will propose a framework for analysing the governing system of 
SDIs and its dynamics, so that we can understand the key processes that enable 
or constrain SDI governance. By applying the framework to two SDI cases, we can 
also evaluate the strong and weak points of this framework. First, we will 
conceptualise what we mean by ‘governance’ and the ‘governing system’ in this 
paper. 
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2. GOVERNANCE AND THE GOVERNING SYSTEM 
2.1. Governance 
The word ‘governance’ has many definitions and meanings. To distinguish the 
multiple governance concepts from each other, many adjectives are added, such 
as ‘good’ governance, ‘network’ governance (Rhodes, 1996), ‘corporate’ 
governance (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004), ‘collaborative’ governance (Ansell 
and Gash, 2008), ‘adaptive’ governance (Dietz et al., 2003), ‘fit-for-purpose’ 
governance (Rijke et al., 2012) or ‘interactive’ governance (Kooiman, 2003). 
Theories on governance are still an ever-expanding universe, which does not make 
it an easy subject to grasp. 
Because of this wide range of governance definitions and ideas, we would like to 
explain the governance perspective we use in this research. This is not to state 
that we have the governance definition, but to understand the governance lens we 
use to study SDIs in this research. Our perspective is a holistic one, in which we 
refer to governance as the governing process in which multiple actors (both public 
and private) can influence this process through interactions. Interactions are a key 
element in governance: ‘interactions shape actors and actors shape interactions’ 
(Kooiman, 2003, p.8).  
Structures or institutions will enable or constrain the governing process, ensuring 
that ‘things don’t fall apart’ (Giddens, 1984; Kooiman, 2003). Structures can be 
formal rules (such as laws, organisations, contracts, standards), but also informal 
(such as culture, norms and values). Structures have a dual nature: they shape 
action and are stable in the short term, beyond the control of one actor. However, 
in the long term structures are changeable and shaped by the actions of the 
interacting actors (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992; Kooiman, 2003).  
Because structures influence governance interactions, a distinction is made 
between an ‘actor’ or ‘intentional’ level, where the day-by-day interaction between 
actors is happening, and a ‘structural’ or ‘institutional’ level, where rules and 
resources enable and constrain the actor level (Figure 1) (Kooiman, 2003). 
‘Governance’ theories originated from insights about networks (Rhodes, 1996; 
Klijn, 2008), but we are also aware that these theories about governance networks 
did not replace older governing theories such as Weberian bureaucracies or the 
market-driven ideas from New Public Management, but added an extra layer 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Therefore, we try not to set boundaries around 
governance; rather, we see that top-down or hierarchical interactions, horizontal, 
network or collaborative interactions and bottom-up or self-organising interactions 
all play an important role in the entire governance process.  
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Figure 1: Relation between the actor level of governance, where actors interact and 
the structural level, which enables and constrains the actor level. 
 
Source: adapted from Kooiman (2003) 
2.2. Governance and SDI dynamics 
Several scholars who tried to summarize and find parallels between the multiple 
governance forms (e.g. Rhodes, 1996; Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011) conclude that governance is shifting. Since the 90s, more and 
more authors have described the rise of network-oriented approaches to 
governance in contrast to hierarchal and market-driven forms. These networks are 
largely self-organising (Rhodes, 1996), posing challenges for ‘classical governing’: 
‘Traditional institutions of checks and balances on power and accountability could 
become obsolete, or at the very least less effective’ (Kersbergen and Waarden, 
2004, p.155). Rhodes notes that ‘Governance as self-organizing networks is a 
challenge to governability because the networks become autonomous and resist 
central guidance’ (Rhodes, 1996, p.667). 
Interestingly, a different development, moving from self-organising networks 
towards more central guidance, has been witnessed in the SDI domain in several 
countries: the Netherlands, Belgium (Sjoukema et al., 2017), the United States 
(Lance et al., 2009) and Australia (Masser et al., 2008). SDIs which originated from 
network initiatives in the early 90s (Masser, 1999) began to strive later on for more 
hierarchical influences, such as central coordination, laws and policies in order to 
gain legitimacy (Sjoukema et al., 2017; Lance et al., 2009). The reason could be 
that SDIs are relatively young infrastructures whose institutions are not yet fully 
developed (De Man, 2006). This maturing of SDI governance makes it an 
interesting subject to analyse how governing systems change. 
As we see SDIs as complex adaptive systems (CAS) (Grus et al., 2010), it is 
questionable if there is an optimal generic governing system for SDIs. Or 
alternatively, it ‘is the question of whether it is at all possible to govern the messy 
and unpredictable nature of CAS’ (Duit and Galaz, 2008, p.329). As every SDI will 
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Interaction
Actor Actor
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have a specific governing system and context due to its complexity, path-
dependency and openness, every SDI may also need an individual governing 
system. However, we can evaluate governing systems over time, compare the 
differences and analyse what works well and what does not. 
A key feature of CAS is their unpredictability and non-linearity. These features are 
also present in governance (Kooiman, 2003; Duit and Galaz, 2008; Rijke et al., 
2012; Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013). Periods of incremental change can be 
followed by fast and sudden change with major and irreversible consequences, 
due to threshold and cascading effects (Duit and Galaz, 2008). Teisman (2000) 
and Klijn & Koppenjan (2016) call these tipping points in governing processes 
‘crucial decisions’. A crucial decision is identifiable when the composition of actors, 
the course of interactions and the content of the governance process dramatically 
change (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016). 
2.3. The Governing System 
In this research, we use the conceptualisations of the governing system by 
Kooiman (Kooiman, 2003). We use his theoretical concepts, as Kooiman is one of 
the few governance scholars who uses a system perspective on governance. Many 
scholars only focus on partial aspects of governance, but Kooiman’s perspective, 
which has been categorised as the socio-cybernetic approach (Rhodes, 1996), 
helps to provide an overview of governance, its relations and interactions. As this 
approach also acknowledges the influence of complexity, diversity and dynamics 
on governance, these theories are a good fit for studying governance of complex 
adaptive systems such as SDIs (Kooiman and Bavinck, 2013). Kooiman’s theories 
even explain changes in governance paradigms themselves (meta-governance) 
(Kooiman, 2003). As we explained earlier, governance paradigms such as New 
Public Management and Open Government have had an impact on the goals and 
development of SDIs (Sjoukema et al., 2017). 
However, we are also aware that this highly dynamic system perspective has a 
downside, as it is either too abstract or too difficult, and too all-encompassing for 
operationalisation on a more detailed level. Nevertheless, as we witness SDI 
governors in practice struggling to gain an overview of governance processes, we 
think it is an insightful analytical framework to use on SDIs. Furthermore, to scope 
our research we focus mainly on the conceptualisations of the governing system 
and adapt and apply it to SDIs to make our system less abstract. 
Kooiman’s governing system can be broken down into four elements: images, 
instruments, action and structures (Figure 2) (Kooiman, 2003). All governing action 
starts with a perceived problem, an image. Problems are not objective: ‘They are 
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social constructions; perception of actors on what makes a situation problematic 
(Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016, p.45).’ Because every actor is autonomous yet 
interdependent, these ‘perceptions’ or ‘images’ can be dissimilar, leading to 
disagreements and conflict (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).  
Figure 2: Simplified conceptual framework of the governing system, based on 
conceptualisations from Kooiman (2003). 
 
Source: adapted from Kooiman (2003) 
Governing instruments are used to force, enable, detect or facilitate certain 
interactions. Choosing an instrument is close to image formation, while putting an 
instrument to use is close to governing action. In governance, all actors can apply 
instruments, but not all actors can apply all instruments: this depends on their 
governing position and resources. ‘Soft instruments’, such as information and 
advice, can be applied by more actors than ‘hard instruments’ such as taxes and 
regulations (Kooiman, 2003).  
Once images are formed and instruments are chosen, they will be applied for 
governing action. This does not necessarily mean that the action will be properly 
adopted. The action element ‘relies upon convincing and socially penetrating 
images and sufficient social-political will or support’ (Kooiman, 2003, p.62). Via 
feedback from affected actors, it can be determined whether the governing action 
was effective and appropriate. The initial image will be altered by this feedback 
(Kooiman, 2003). 
The structural level is where structures such as institutions and resources reside. 
Structures are necessary to steer, guide and facilitate governing action, but they 
can also frustrate and block governance. Governance focussed on changing the 
structural level is what Kooiman calls ‘second-order governance’, as opposed to 
‘first-order governance’ which can be seen as the day-by-day governance aimed 
at problem solving (Kooiman, 2003). 
Actor level
Image Instruments Action
Structural level
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Actor Actor
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1. Cases 
To understand the governance dynamics of SDIs, we use the conceptual 
framework of the governing system to study two Dutch SDI cases: the ‘Risk Map’ 
(Risicokaart) and the ‘New Map of the Netherlands’ (Nieuwe Kaart van Nederland). 
One of the reasons for choosing these cases is their age, as both cases date from 
around 2000, which makes it possible to review the changes in their governing 
systems over time. Both cases can be seen as goal-oriented SDIs, as they focus 
on a certain theme to collect and disseminate spatial data. Both cases operate in 
a multi-actor environment where local, regional and national governments are 
involved. Most data of these SDIs are also openly accessible from quite an early 
stage. However, their governing systems and their developmental paths are very 
different. By choosing two distinct cases, it can be determined whether it is useful 
to perform an analysis with the governing system framework. 
To order data on governance processes over time, we use the heuristic method 
from Klijn and Koppenjan (2016) to divide the cases into ‘rounds’. A ‘round’ is a 
time interval which starts and ends with a crucial decision. A crucial decision is 
identifiable when the composition of actors, the course of interactions and the 
content of the governance process dramatically change (Klijn and Koppenjan, 
2016). In each case, we identified a crucial decision that forced the governing 
system to change. The following section will describe the cases and the identified 
rounds. 
3.1.1. Risk Map (Risicokaart) 
In 2000, a great disaster struck the city of Enschede, the Netherlands. A fireworks 
depot exploded in close proximity to a residential neighbourhood. Twenty-two 
people were killed, 950 persons were injured, around 500 homes were destroyed 
and 1,500 buildings were damaged. One of the conclusions was that many citizens 
were not aware that they were living near a fireworks depot and that information 
about such hazardous locations was fragmented (Oosting, 2001). Realising that 
there were many more potentially dangerous companies and facilities in the 
Netherlands, the Dutch national government ordered the creation of a so-called 
‘Risk Map’ (Dutch: Risicokaart) which should be accessible for all citizens and on 
which all potential hazards should be visible (De Vries, 2001).  
To create the map, the national, regional and local governments with the 
responsibility to grant permits for these hazardous facilities, supplied information 
for the Risk Map. This information is collected in a central database and 
disseminated. Apart from serving to inform citizens, the Risk Map was also of value 
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for emergency services which prepare for and prevent potential disasters, and for 
organisations planning new housing areas. The Risk Map is open to everyone, 
although more detailed information is only accessible for governments via a log-in. 
Two rounds for the Risk Map can be distinguished: one round is the period from 
2000 till 2013 and the other is from 2014 till now. After multiple negative signals in 
2013, such as a negative inspection report and a letter of protest from civil 
servants, the crucial decision came that the Risk Map could not continue in its 
current form. On a technical level, the SDI had become impossible to maintain, 
because it used legacy software and many customised add-ons. On the 
institutional level, roles and responsibilities of actors were not clear enough to 
coordinate the Risk Map properly. Or in other words: the governing system no 
longer functioned well enough. Since then, considerable effort has gone into 
renewing the governing system and improving the Risk Map’s data and technology. 
3.1.2. New Map of the Netherlands (Nieuwe Kaart van Nederland) 
As a small and densely populated country, the Netherlands has a long tradition of 
spatial planning. However, to satisfactorily plan how many new houses and 
commercial buildings are required and where they should be located, one needs 
information on and an overview of all the current plans. Therefore, the ‘New Map 
of the Netherlands’ (Nieuwe Kaart van Nederland) was presented in 1997, based 
on a project from several planning associations to collect all local and regional 
plans and assemble them into one national map.  
The first ‘New Map’ was mainly an analogue, one-time affair, yet people were 
aware that this was valuable information which should be updated. An organisation 
devoted to the New Map of the Netherlands was established, which collected all 
plans from local municipalities, digitised and standardised them and disseminated 
them to the public as the New Map of the Netherlands. As an important policy 
instrument for analysing and monitoring spatial planning, it received budgetary 
support from the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
(VROM). This all continued until 2010, when funding from the ministry suddenly 
stopped, despite the popularity of this information source. 
In view of its popularity and the valuable data it provided for spatial planners, 
researchers and governments, several initiatives were undertaken to research a 
rebirth of the New Map. In 2018, a few individuals involved in collecting and 
disseminating data about spatial planning formed an organisation, established a 
foundation and succeeded in relaunching the ‘New Map of the Netherlands’.  
As with the Risk Map, two rounds can be identified within the New Map of the 
Netherlands case. The crucial decision of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
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and the Environment (VROM) to stop funding this map in 2010 marks the end of 
round 1. Without these resources, the New Map was not able to continue. 
However, this did not end the need and ideas for a New Map, and by self-
organisation, the New Map underwent its rebirth. This phase of self-organisation 
from 2010 onwards forms the second round. 
3.2. Data collection 
For our empirical analysis, we used two kinds of sources. On the one hand, we 
conducted semi-structured interviews with involved actors. Actors were asked how 
they perceived the SDI and its governing system in the past (when they became 
involved in the SDI), how the SDI and its governance developed from then and 
how they experienced it nowadays. In this way, a great deal of information about 
the governing system and its evolution unfolded. In total, we spoke to nine persons 
about the New Map of the Netherlands and to eight about the Risk Map. The 
interviewed persons held a variety of SDI positions, such as SDI coordinators, data 
users and data providers, and had varying track records (long and short 
involvement). This provided a complete picture of the governing system and its 
inner workings.  
However, as we wanted to study the longitudinal development and memories can 
change, we also used documents as a complementary information source. An 
important advantage of documents is that they are stable and therefore not altered 
by memories. For our document analysis, we used primary sources such as official 
policy documents, newsletters and reports as well as articles in industry 
magazines. Furthermore, every interviewee was asked whether she or he had 
important document sources to study. In total, 33 additional documents were 
analysed for the Risk Map and 26 for the New Map of the Netherlands. 
3.3. Coding 
Both sources of information, the documents and transcripts of the interviews, were 
coded with the help of ATLAS.ti coding software. For this coding, the qualitative 
content analysis method, also known as ethnographic content analysis, was used. 
With this method, a coding framework is iteratively built up by going through the 
contents (Bryman, 2012). In this case, we started with four main categories (image, 
instrument, action and structures) and combined the categories with information 
about what kind of image, instrument, action or structure we found in a piece of 
text.  
To begin with, the above method was used to code the documents and interview 
transcripts of the Risk Map, resulting in a long list of codes about images, 
instruments, action and structures. During coding it became apparent that, to 
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obtain a better understanding of SDI governance dynamics, we would need two 
extra categories: interactions and SDI performance qualities. As governance is 
founded on interactions, we added the interaction category to understand the 
formality and direction of interactions used within a round. The category of SDI 
performance qualities was added to get a basic understanding of the performance, 
data quality and use of the SDI. SDI governance shapes SDI qualities, but SDI 
qualities also shape SDI governance. It is essential to understand this relationship 
in order to explain SDI governance dynamics. 
In the next step, multiple codes were combined or refined, so that analysis of the 
codes is more efficient and it becomes easier to find patterns. The creation of these 
subcategories was also based on findings from current scientific SDI and 
governance literature. For many subcategories, it was decided to make an 
additional distinction as to whether the subcategory influenced the governance 
positively or negatively. Every piece of coded text was revised with the new refined 
coding framework. This framework was also used to code the other Risk Map and 
New Map of the Netherlands texts. Finally, all codes were checked for consistency 
and redundancy. Every interview and document was checked at least twice.  
The next section will operationalise and explain the coding framework we used. 
3.4. Coding framework 
In the final version of the coding framework, 60 codes were used. As most codes 
had both a positive and negative attribution, 30 code subcategories divided over 
six main categories (images, interactions, instruments, actions, structures and SDI 
performance qualities) were used. This section will briefly explain these codes and 
their link with scientific literature.  
3.4.1. Images 
The following codes were used to code the category of images. 
 Satisfaction (positive/negative) 
 Feedback loop (positive/negative) 
 Collaborative (aligned/unaligned) 
 Goal/vision (explicit/individual) 
Every involved actor has their own perception about the SDI and the governing 
system. Collecting these images is useful for understanding the satisfaction of 
actors. In this research we coded both positive and negative remarks to gain an 
indication of the satisfaction of actors regarding the SDI and its governing system. 
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Feedback loops, both positive and negative, are an important feature of complex 
adaptive systems when adjusting inputs and processes (Grus et al., 2010) and are 
also essential for SDIs (De Man, 2006). With continuous feedback, the governing 
image can be adjusted (Kooiman, 2003). Therefore, we coded both positive 
feedback and negative feedback to get a sense of the feedback flow. 
As images can be very dissimilar, actors should make their image explicit in order 
to make the image controllable and the governing action legitimate (Kooiman, 
2003). To converge images, actors need time, space and processes for discussion 
to reconcile their images with other actors (Dang et al., 2015). Converging the 
images of involved actors is an important step in making the governing action more 
effective. We coded the collaborative images between actors as aligned or 
unaligned by identifying agreement and disagreement among involved actors. 
An explicit image is a vision or common goal. When a vision is shared by all actors, 
it is a powerful tool (Kok and van Loenen, 2005). In this sense the vision will be 
shaped by the collective images of individual stakeholders and vice versa: images 
of individual stakeholders will mirror the shared and outspoken vision. We coded 
goals or visions as being explicit or individual. The latter code is mainly suitable for 
qualitative analysis aiming to understand how actors see the future of the SDI.  
3.4.2. Interactions 
The following codes were used to code the category of interactions. 
 Interferences (bottom-up/top-down) 
 Interplays (bottom-up/top-down) 
 Interventions (bottom-up/top-down) 
Governance processes consist of interactions between actors, bound by 
structures. However, the choice for certain types of interactions explains whether 
an SDI is mainly hierarchically governed, network-governed or self-governed. 
Kooiman (2003) distinguishes three types of interaction: interferences, interplays 
and intervention. Interferences are the least organised kind of societal interaction 
and can be seen as the ‘primary’ daily societal interaction processes. Interplays 
can be seen as ‘horizontal’, semi-formalised interactions. Interplays are the central 
interaction form of network governing. Interventions are the most formalised 
interactions and are aimed at direct influence (Kooiman, 2003). 
To make a further distinction in interaction, the direction of interaction was 
assessed. Therefore, we made a distinction between bottom-up and top-down, 
determined by the hierarchical position of the actor and the direction of the 
interaction. Top-down does not mean in this context that the interaction necessarily 
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came from the actor at the top of the hierarchy (such as the national government), 
but that the interaction came from an actor in a higher governing position. 
Although interplays are meant as horizontal interactions, they can have a kind of 
direction. For example, in a working group where actors from both the national and 
the local governments participate, interplays can have an implicit direction. 
However, it is not always possible to distinguish this. 
3.4.3. Instruments 
The following codes were used to code the category of instruments. 
 Information (detector/effector) 
 Organisation (detector/effector) 
 Rule (detector/effector) 
There is an enormous array of potential governing instruments (Kooiman, 2003). 
Multiple scholars have categorised governing instruments (e.g. Bemelmans-Videc 
et al., 1998) and lists of useful SDI governance instruments also exist (see 
Crompvoets et al., 2018; Vancauwenberghe and van Loenen, 2017). However, in 
this research we are more interested in the balance and choice for certain 
instrument types than in exactly what an instrument aims for. 
Kooiman (2003) describes three categories of instruments, which are connected 
to his categorisation of interaction types: information, organisation and rule. Under 
the category of information, we coded communication instruments, such as 
newsletters and presentations, as well as more informal and thus interferential type 
of interactions, such as phone calls and informal discussions for sending or 
obtaining information. Under organisation, we coded more formalised instruments 
such as task allocation and the formation of work and steering committees. Under 
rule, we coded the most formal instruments, such as policies and laws.  
An extension was made to draw a distinction between ‘detectors’ and ‘effectors’ as 
proposed by Hood (1983). The previously stated coding examples for instruments 
can be seen as effectors: instruments which are used to influence society (Hood, 
1983). Detectors are instruments which are used for taking in information and thus 
strengthen the image. An example of a detector for information is collecting 
feedback on a conference floor. An example of a detector instrument of 
organisation is using research, reporting or key performance indicators to gain 
information in a more structured way. An example of a detector for rule is an official 
investigation, audit or inspection. 
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3.4.4. Action 
The following codes were used to code the category of action. 
 Leadership (present/lacking) 
 Coordination (present/lacking) 
 Self-organisation (present/lacking) 
 Collaboration (present/lacking) 
To steer governing action in the right direction, leadership, coordination and self-
organisation can be used (Kooiman, 2003). Additionally, in SDI literature, 
leadership and the need for ‘white knights’ is designated as ‘critical’ for an SDI (Kok 
and van Loenen, 2005; Craig, 2005). Besides leadership, SDI literature recognises 
the need for coordination as essential (Dessers et al., 2012; Vancauwenberghe, 
2013). Therefore we coded leadership and coordination. For each code in the 
action category we coded them as present or lacking.  
Self-organisation is also an interesting example of a governing action for SDIs (Kok 
and van Loenen, 2005; Welle Donker and van Loenen, 2017). The self-organising 
ability of the SDI community seems an important precondition for ensuring SDI 
survival (Sjoukema et al., 2017). In addition, we coded self-organisation as being 
available or lacking, although the latter is not often mentioned. 
We added an extra action element not found in Kooiman, collaboration, as close 
collaboration will foster governing action. It can be argued that collaboration is 
almost the same as self-organisation. However, during coding we observed that 
weak collaboration or coordination can lead to more self-organisation, as actors 
start to create various solutions individually, which leads to more information 
fragmentation. Like the other action categories, we coded for collaboration as 
being either present or lacking. 
3.4.5. Structures 
The following codes were used to code the category of structures. 
 Roles and responsibilities (enabling/constraining) 
 Ownership (enabling/constraining) 
 Law (enabling/constraining) 
 Budget resources (enabling/constraining) 
 Time resources (enabling/constraining) 
 Knowledge resources (enabling/constraining) 
 Political capital (enabling/constraining) 
 Social capital (enabling/constraining) 
 Standards (enabling/constraining) 
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 Technology (enabling/constraining) 
 Support (enabling/constraining) 
 Trust (enabling/constraining) 
 Culture (enabling/constraining) 
As all governing actions are bound by structures, structures play a vital role in the 
governing system. However, they can both enable or constrain governing action. 
Therefore, for each code in the structure category we identified whether it is 
enabling or constraining. 
The involvement of stakeholders can be institutionalised by creating coordinating 
functions or entities. In this way, roles and responsibilities are allocated and some 
hierarchical difference between the coordinator and the coordinated organisations 
is generally implied (Crompvoets et al., 2018). A special kind of responsibility is 
ownership, which adds an extra dimension of commitment for stakeholders to (a 
part of) the SDI system (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Therefore, we coded both roles 
and responsibilities and ownership. 
Legal frameworks, formal policies and regulations for data sharing are often 
mentioned as important enablers for SDIs (Rajabifard et al., 2002; 
Vancauwenberghe et al., 2018; UN-GGIM, 2017; Vancauwenberghe and van 
Loenen, 2017). Yet, laws can also become a constraining factor. In cases where 
these policies and laws were legally binding, we categorised these formal 
structures into the category law. 
The choice for instruments is strongly connected with the availability of resources 
on the structural level. Indeed, the availability of budgetary resources is an 
important condition for SDIs (Welle Donker, 2009; Vancauwenberghe and van 
Loenen, 2017; Welle Donker and van Loenen, 2017). However, in our coding 
framework we also recognised four other resources: time resources, knowledge 
resources, political capital and social capital. Among time resources, we assume 
that actors have permission and opportunity to spend time on a certain subject. 
Among knowledge resources, we assume the availability of knowledge and 
expertise. Although Kooiman (2003) uses the term social-political capital, we 
choose to split this concept in two. In our research, social capital denotes 
availability of and access to social networks. By political capital, we mean 
availability of and access to hierarchical decision-making power. A person with 
political capital does not have to be a politician, but can also be the executive 
director of an organisation. 
We used two codes which are especially applicable to SDIs. These are technology 
and standards. Technology (or access network) and standards are important 
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enablers for SDIs and are seen as core SDI components (Rajabifard et al., 2002). 
However, we noticed during coding that these two structures can also act as 
constraints to SDI renewal. 
Support can be seen as the structural component of governing action (Kooiman, 
2003). Support from both the political level and the ‘work floor’ is needed to enable 
SDI development (Kok and van Loenen, 2005; Vancauwenberghe and van 
Loenen, 2017; Vancauwenberghe et al., 2018). We did not make a distinction 
between these levels, as by combining the support code with, say, the political 
capital code, the source of support can become clear. 
Finally we coded two other soft structures: trust and culture. Trust is an important 
pre-condition for governing actions such as collaboration. Culture proved the most 
difficult structure to code from texts, as it is usually an unconscious structure. An 
enabling or constraining culture is only recognised by actors when persons are 
introduced to a new organisational culture.  
3.4.6. SDI performance qualities 
As it appeared that developments in SDI governance cannot be disconnected from 
SDI performance, we added three codes to obtain a basic indication of SDI 
qualities: 
 Use (use/non-use) 
 Data provision (good/bad) 
 Data quality and availability (high/low) 
Although it is not our goal to properly assess an SDI, it is helpful to gain insights 
into the SDI performance qualities during the governance rounds. We coded six 
aspects of SDI performance in three pairs: good data provision/bad data provision; 
high data quality and availability/low data quality and availability; and use/non-use. 
Under data provision, we understand the willingness and the actual provision of 
data by actors. Data quality and availability is a combined code, encompassing 
data quality aspects as well as the availability of services. Of course, data is shared 
to be used: the codes for use and non-use indicate whether actors state that they 
deliberately use or do not use the data provided by the SDI. 
Figure 3 summarises the coding framework used, as embedded in the framework 
of the governing system. 
3.5. Analysis 
Coding the documents and transcripts had two purposes. On the one hand, it 
provided more insights and better interpretation of the collected material for a 
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qualitative analysis of how the SDI and its governing system evolved. On the other 
hand, it helped us to see patterns and trends emerge, and to discover differences 
in the governance system between rounds. 
Figure 3: Visual summary of the coding framework, positioned in the framework of 
the governing system.  
 
To discover patterns and trends in documents and transcripts, the frequency of a 
code can be used. However, as the total number of coded texts was not equal 
between rounds, we had to look at the relative frequency of codes. These were 
calculated via two methods: one was to calculate an indicator per code based on 
the total number of codes per round; the other indicator was to look at the relative 
frequency within a category of codes, for example by observing the relative 
presence of the code ‘collaboration’ within the category ‘action’. If the difference 
between the first round and the second round was more than 0.5% for the first 
indicator and/or more than 1.5% for the second indicator, this difference was 
recorded as a shift. The appendix of this paper shows the coding results. 
It should be mentioned that, despite the careful process of coding, looking at these 
relative code frequencies is not a trustworthy method to make strong statements 
about a governing system in a certain period. This is because the codes’ source 
material can cause them to become biased. For example, many documents and 
interview candidates explained the origin of the Risk Map with the fireworks 
disaster in Enschede and the concept of a Risk Map which emerged from it. This 
causes a very high code frequency for ‘explicit vision’ in round one of the Risk Map 
compared to round two, but this does not necessarily mean there is a lack of explicit 
vision in round two. Nevertheless, using these frequencies as an indicator in 
combination with the qualitative analysis proved a helpful tool for identifying trends 
and shifts in the governing system. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Risk Map 
4.1.1. Round 1: 2000 – 2013 
After the fireworks disaster in 2000 in Enschede, the image was clear: there was a 
lack of central information about potential hazards and the communication about 
these potential hazards to citizens was poor (Oosting, 2001). This image was not 
entirely new. A few provinces had already started to work on a risk registry before 
2000. But after the disaster, the national government demanded that there should 
be a Risk Map at the national level (De Vries, 2001). 
Several roles and responsibilities were allocated by the national government. 
Municipalities were assigned the task of making an inventory of potential hazards 
and a crisis response plan for each hazard. The Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations took the initiative to develop a model for a Risk Map in 
collaboration with municipalities and provinces. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment was given the task of setting up a registry for 
hazardous substances (De Vries, 2001). At first, this registry was intended as an 
independent database, but after a successful lobby it was decided in 2005 to 
integrate this registry into the Risk Map and use it as one of its main datasets. 
However, ownership of this registry remained with the Ministry of Housing, while 
the Risk Map was owned by the Ministry of the Interior. Because both ministries 
had the task of designing laws and regulations (one of them for the Risk Map and 
the other for the registry for hazardous substances), close collaboration between 
the provinces and ministries was necessary to prevent inconsistencies.  
The provinces had the task of creating and maintaining a Risk Map. At that time, 
the development of an SDI was technologically challenging. This assignment thus 
ushered in a period of innovation and self-organisation. Several provinces took the 
initiative to develop a Risk Map system and experiment with its creation. As 
provinces were not used to collaborating with one another to develop a central 
system, the first idea was to create a model from which each of the 12 provinces 
could create its own Risk Map SDI. By mixing several best practices and designing 
a flexible system which provinces could extend, a central SDI was designed (FO 
MRK projectteam et al., 2003). After several years of development, the first version 
of the Risk Map was launched in 2006. 
After the terrorist attack on New York’s World Trade Center in 2001, the scope and 
goal of the Risk Map suddenly became a point of political discussion. It was argued 
that a public map which located all potential risks could be easily misused by 
terrorists. The discussion was settled by creating a public version for citizens 
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providing a basic overview and a secured environment where crisis response 
teams and governments could obtain more detailed information. 
In 2007, the Risk Map and its accompanying laws were in place. The two ministries 
withdrew their active involvement and transferred most responsibilities for 
coordinating, maintaining and developing the Risk Map to the twelve provinces of 
the Netherlands. Because twelve provinces had to maintain one national 
application, they founded a provincial shared service organisation for maintaining 
the technological aspects of the Risk Map. Each province stayed responsible for 
policy making concerning the Risk Map. The data was mainly provided by 
municipalities. 
The Risk Map was subjected to continued experimentation and innovation. New 
features were added and a pilot for a cross-border data infrastructure was 
organised. In 2010, many legal tasks and responsibilities of the provinces 
concerning safety and crisis management were transferred to newly created ‘safety 
regions’. These regions became main users of the professional version of the Risk 
Map, while use by provinces diminished. Additionally, ownership of the Risk Map 
was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Justice and 
Security. However, tasks and responsibilities for the Risk Map itself remained with 
the provinces.  
After this shift in responsibilities, support for the Risk Map crumbled. The national 
government had been showing little interest since the implementation of the legal 
framework, and with the transfer of legal responsibilities to the safety regions, 
provincial support weakened as well. During the years of innovation and 
experimentation, features were added without revising the system itself, making it 
a very complex and costly system to maintain and improve. Furthermore, providing 
the data was very time-consuming for the municipalities and not every municipality 
had the knowledge to provide the data accurately, which resulted in poor data 
quality. Because of these problems and the lack of confidence in a solution, several 
provinces actively chose to diminish support and execute tasks only if they were 
legally necessary. 
At the end of 2013, an inspection by the Ministry of Justice and Security concluded 
that the Risk Map was not an effective instrument for risk communication, because 
of the untrustworthy data quality and a lack of coordination. These problems were 
seen as interrelated (Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie, 2013). In 2014, the twelve 
provincial coordinators urged changes as the technologies and contents of the Risk 
Map, as well as policies for administering it, were all outdated. 
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4.1.2. Round 2: 2014 – Now 
The provincial coordinators’ call for change was heeded. A task force studied the 
problems associated with the Risk Map and made recommendations for 
improvements. A central programme manager was appointed and a plan to 
improve the Risk Map’s governance was drawn up. Roles and responsibilities were 
made more explicit. Ever since, the main provincial responsibility for the Risk Map 
has been borne not by all twelve provinces, but by one provincial deputy, who is a 
member of the Association of Provinces and acts as owner. In addition, the steering 
committee of the Association of Provinces changed into a committee with a 
stronger focus on content rather than financial resources. This centralisation of the 
Risk Map’s ownership endowed it with improved political capital.  
On the operational level as well, more structures were added. The provincial 
shared service organisation improved its change management process by making 
it more transparent for the provincial coordinators. Every year, an annual plan is 
now drafted in collaboration with the programme manager. There are two provincial 
committees, one on the operational level and another on the tactical level, where 
collaborative decision making takes place. 
The provinces are also trying to involve the two ministries more, as they are still 
responsible for the Risk Map and its accompanying laws. Renewing the laws is 
seen as necessary, as some of its contents are outdated. Furthermore, new actors 
such as the safety regions are now involved, but their legal responsibilities and 
involvement with the Risk Map are not clear. 
The new goal and vision of the Risk Map is to build a new SDI to replace the old 
legacy system. The new system should be more lightweight and reuse existing 
data, so providing data would become easier. Another idea is to provide all data 
as open data, so the authorised part of the Risk Map could disappear. The new 
Environment and Planning Act, which is a programme to modernise, harmonise 
and simplify current rules in the Netherlands and improve its data provision by 
building an SDI, is seen as an opportunity for the Risk Map by some actors, while 
others see it as a threat. 
The Risk Map still faces some major challenges. Support for the Risk Map varies 
from province to province. Some argue that responsibility for the Risk Map should 
be transferred to the safety regions. The safety regions are legally responsible for 
risk communication nowadays, but lack a formal role in the Risk Map. As a result, 
they now self-organise to build new Risk Map products on top of data and services 
from the current Risk Map. Also, in many regions, environmental services have 
taken over the job of data providers from municipalities. This has led to an 
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improvement in data provision, but these environmental services also lack a formal 
role in the governing system of the Risk Map. 
In 2019, a report from the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of 
Justice and Security (Bongers et al., 2019) concluded that while the roles and 
responsibilities have been made more clear, the legal and organisational context 
of the Risk Map still is too complex. More changes to the Risk Map on a structural 
level seem inevitable. 
4.1.3. Analysis of the governing system 
When we compare the relative frequencies of round 1 codes with those for round 
2, we can see interesting trends (see Figure 4). When we look at the image, the 
collaborative image seems to be less unaligned in round 2 than in round 1. A 
possible explanation could be that the emergence of the Risk Map’s ‘governing 
crisis’ sparked more alignment of images. Additionally, more positive feedback is 
now flowing through the system. However, the satisfaction in both rounds seem to 
be more negative than positive. 
Figure 4 Shift in the governing system of the Risk Map in round 2 compared to 
round 1, based on the relative frequency of codes. 
 
When we look at the interaction patterns, we can see that round 1 has more top-
down interventions than round 2. This is easily explained by the order from the 
national government to create a Risk Map after the fireworks disaster in Enschede. 
Interplays are the main form of interaction in both rounds. Because twelve 
provinces have the shared task of creating a Risk Map, this interaction form seems 
a logical fit. 
Coordination is improved in the second round, as a lack of coordination was one 
of the main concerns in the first round. However, collaboration seems to be better 
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in the first round. From the interviews it appeared that especially the collaboration 
with and coordination of the national government could be improved. In the second 
round we also see a decrease in support and trust, which affects collaboration.  
Self-organisation is present in both rounds. However, from the interviews it 
appears that this is not always positive. In many cases, an increase in self-
organisation occurs when coordination is lacking or the stakeholder’s requirements 
are not fulfilled. This self-organisation can lead to fragmentation of information and 
systems. 
Although coordination is improved, the codes indicate no strong change either in 
roles and responsibilities, or in ownership. This can be explained by the fact that 
roles and responsibilities have been made clearer within the provincial structures; 
however, the involvement and roles of the safety regions and environmental 
services remain unclear. Furthermore, many find the dual ownership by two 
ministries a constraining structure. 
Law and standards are also seen as constraining structures in the second round, 
as many find these out of date. However, the legal framework also acts as a lifeline 
for the Risk Map; quitting is legally not possible. Another clear constraint is 
technology, as the current SDI has become too complex to maintain. On the other 
hand, there is a strong belief that technology can be an enabler when a new Risk 
Map system is built. 
This relates also to another constraint; the budgetary resources. In fact, there is no 
shortage of funding for the Risk Map, but many actors think the costs of the current 
system outweigh its benefits. The greatest share of the budget goes to maintaining 
the outdated technology. An important condition for the new Risk Map is actors’ 
expectations that its maintenance should be cheaper than that of its immediate 
predecessor.  
The codes about SDI performance qualities give mixed results in every area (data 
provision, data quality/availability and use). From the interviews and reports, it is 
clear that data quality has improved slightly over the past years, but that users still 
cannot fully trust the data.  
4.2. New Map of the Netherlands 
4.2.1. Round 1: 1997 – 2010 
The New Map of the Netherlands was an idea of spatial planners who required 
more information to obtain a better overview of the spatial dynamics in the 
Netherlands. This need for information was not new, as the National Planning 
Office (Rijksplanologische Dienst) in the Netherlands had previously tried to gather 
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statistics about the current and planned building capacity. However, what was new 
here was the need to spatially locate these plans. First, regional maps with spatial 
plans were made in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The idea to do this for the whole 
of the Netherlands gained a great deal of momentum and the ‘New Map of the 
Netherlands Association’ was formed. 
Hundreds of urban and spatial planners volunteered in 1997 to collect data and 
create a map showing what the Netherlands would look like in 2005. The New Map 
of the Netherlands was widely introduced, gaining much attention from politicians, 
professionals and the general public. Because of its success, the ambition was to 
create a ‘New Map’ every two years, making it possible to look even further into 
the future.  
Meanwhile, around the same time, the National Planning Office also needed a 
geographical overview of all national plans. Therefore, they made a national map, 
‘the Netherlands in Plans’, not only showing concrete plans for the near future but 
also ‘softer’ long-term plans. One of the information sources it used was the New 
Map, and in 2003 it was decided that the New Map of the Netherlands would 
receive a subsidy from the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (VROM). The New Map also incorporated the idea of making a 
distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘concrete’ plans.  
From then on, the New Map was administered as follows. The Ministry acted as 
client to the New Map Association. The map itself was executed by an association 
for spatial planners, NIROV, which hired several employees to call municipalities 
and scan newspaper articles to collect information about spatial plans. Typically, 
they had to digitise analogue maps with GIS and fill in the attributes in a 
standardised manner while working with unstructured plans: a labour-intensive 
method.  
In a way, the organisation was ahead of its time. In 2006, they decided to open all 
data with a CC-BY Creative Commons license. The association also experimented 
with new dissemination channels, creating the first web mapping service (WMS) in 
the Netherlands and a KML file to integrate into Google Earth. Also, the update 
frequency was speeded up from releasing a New Map every two years to updating 
it every month. 
However, the New Map did not fulfil all information needs. As decentralisation 
continued, spatial planning in the Netherlands became less of a national affair and 
provinces became responsible for keeping an eye on all municipal plans. The 
province of North Holland noticed that the New Map was mainly spatially focussed; 
it therefore developed its own monitoring system, which included also statistical 
aspects of new residential areas. The advantage of this system was that it directly 
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involved municipalities as data providers, giving the data a more authoritative 
character. In 2009, the province of South Holland developed a similar system, 
which they later also opened up to other provinces in the Netherlands. 
In 2010, due to the economic crisis, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment had to cut its budget and decided not to fund the New Map 
anymore. By suspending its payment for the labour-intensive data collection, the 
Ministry could easily save one million Euros per year. Furthermore, it was argued 
that because of the decentralisation of spatial planning, involvement of the national 
government was no longer needed. A digital system for legal zoning plans was 
also introduced in 2008, already giving a much better overview of spatial dynamics 
in the Netherlands.  
The decision to stop funding the New Map was a hard one for the association. 
Together with civil servants, they tried to find other organisations to support the 
New Map, but they did not succeed as those organisations were wary of the costs. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis had slowed spatial planning down and caused 
house prices to drop dramatically, and there were great doubts that matters would 
improve. Without any funding, the association and the New Map of the Netherlands 
itself had to cease operations. 
4.2.2. Round 2: 2010 – Now 
Several initiatives started to bring the New Map back to the political agenda. In 
2011 a study on behalf of the national government showed the need for more 
information about spatial planning and set up ideas for a new, affordable, official 
monitoring system. From the findings, it became clear that almost every province 
was already collecting information about building plans for residential purposes, 
although their approach differed. However, no follow-up study was commissioned 
to centralise these different systems. 
Meanwhile, the monitoring systems of the province of North Holland and South 
Holland were in place, which raised interest from the other provinces. A study was 
performed to decide which of these two monitoring systems was a better fit for the 
other provinces’ purposes. It was decided that the South Holland system would be 
better, as it used open standards and open source software. Six of the Netherlands’ 
12 provinces joined the system of South Holland, while the North Holland system 
was adopted by two provinces. The province of Limburg created its own system. 
The remaining three provinces of the Netherlands do not have a monitoring system 
for spatial plans. 
In 2016, an independent National Government advisor on the Built and Rural 
Environment took the initiative to collaborate with the two owners of the North and 
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South Holland systems. The three founders organised themselves into an 
association and launched the ‘New New Map of the Netherlands’ in 2018. The 
initiative gained support from several users, among them the Ministry of the Interior 
(nowadays responsible for spatial planning) and the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency. Both provide the association with some funding in exchange 
for participation in the association. 
Combining the data of the two provincial systems made it possible to create a map 
with plans of approximately half the country. However, municipalities can choose 
for various reasons to restrict access to their plans, and deny access to the public. 
Therefore, data for only a small part of the country are available to the public. The 
current challenge is to convince other municipalities and provinces to voluntarily 
release their plans. One instrument the association uses is to make the data 
provision as easy as possible, by allowing provinces to use their own data model. 
The association then manually transforms the data by itself and adds it to the New 
New Map. 
4.2.3. Analysis of the governing system 
When the decision was made to stop producing and disseminating the New Map, 
the governing system of the New Map of the Netherlands changed drastically. 
When we compare the relative frequency of codes from round 1 to round 2 (see 
Figure 5), we see a decrease in most aspects regarding the organisation of an SDI, 
such as an explicit image (goal/vision), the action ‘coordination’, the instrument 
‘rule’ and structures such as ‘roles and responsibilities’, ‘standards’ and 
‘ownership’. When we look at softer aspects, we also see in the second round that 
images are less aligned and there seems to be less trust. Also, the data 
quality/availability and use seem less.  
Interestingly, support for the SDI and data provision is increased, as well as 
decreased. This is all explained by the fact that in every interview, the candidates 
mentioned the challenge of convincing all provinces and municipalities to open up 
and provide their plans. While there are clear and supportive advocates and data 
providers, at this moment the New New Map covers less than half of the 
Netherlands, which makes data availability one of the main challenges for this SDI. 
Somewhat surprisingly, technology also seems to be more constraining in the 
second round than in the first. This can be partly explained by the fact that both 
owners of the current provincial systems point out the drawbacks of their system. 
Furthermore, in the first round, the New Map was embracing new technologies and 
seemed ahead of its time in its dissemination channels.  
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Figure 5 Shift in the governing system of the New Map of the Netherlands in round 
2 compared to round 1, based on the relative frequency of codes. 
 
Still, not everything has decreased in comparison with the first round. The codes 
indicate a relative increase in leadership, self-organisation and social capital. Not 
surprising is the fact that in both rounds most codes in the category ‘action’ are 
about self-organisation, as the New Map is in both rounds a product of self-
organisation. Interestingly, budget resources have become less enabling but also 
less constraining. This can be explained by the fact that the budget for the New 
New Map has been greatly trimmed—some estimate that the current costs are ten 
times lower—while it is a much greater challenge to raise enough money from 
supporting organisations than it was during the years of stable financing from the 
ministry. 
It is clear that the governing system of the New Map of the Netherlands has 
become much more vulnerable in the second round. This is not surprising, as the 
current SDI is almost completely based on a self-organising network of 
professional volunteers, with virtually no structures. Although making the SDI 
vulnerable, this approach also generates goodwill and support, as many 
interviewees argued that a legal, top-down approach would probably not benefit 
this SDI in view of the uncertainty and unofficial character of the plans. As the New 
New Map initiative is very young, only time will tell how successful this SDI could 
be. It is clear from its own predecessor that from a self-organised SDI, a more 
structurally embedded SDI can emerge. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to understand SDI governance dynamics by means of a 
thorough analysis of the governing system. With the help of the governing system 
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framework, more insights into the strong and weak aspects of the governing 
system became apparent. By comparing governing systems of an SDI over time, 
changes in the governing system appear. This could be a helpful analytical tool for 
SDI governors who want to assess the governing system of their SDI. For our 
research, we used a thorough analysis based on documents and interviews. 
However, with some modifications the framework can perhaps also be used for 
quick scan purposes or in combination with other data collection methods.  
For analytical purposes, we divided the cases into rounds to analyse the governing 
system. For the New Map, which experienced a sudden stop, this time interval 
seems to fit. However, for the Risk Map, which gradually evolved into a crisis 
situation and also incrementally tried to break away from it, a finer-grained time 
interval would probably give even more insights into changes in the governing 
system. Longitudinal research which assesses the governing system of an SDI 
year by year would be a revealing topic for complementary study. 
One drawback of our focus on the governing system only is the fact that external 
factors are not taken into account. These external factors are unpredictable and 
beyond the control of the actors in the governing system, but in both case studies 
we see that external factors actually seemed at least partly responsible for the 
crisis situation in the governing system. As a result of changes in the political and 
economic system, it was decided to stop funding the New Map. Similarly, the 
decision to reorganise the safety and disaster system in the Netherlands caused 
problems for the Risk Map, whose organisation remained largely based on the old 
system. Like other complex adaptive systems, this openness and sensitivity to 
external factors is a feature of SDIs (Grus et al., 2010), but this does not make SDI 
governing an easy and predictable job. 
In this respect, it is interesting that many involved interviewees imagine a future 
where multiple SDIs and datasets are connected. In both case studies, an 
important future goal is to diminish data providers’ effort by reusing existing data 
and connecting data to other datasets and SDIs. Spatial data provision is evolving 
from central to decentralised, towards an ecosystem of spatial and non-spatial data 
infrastructures where both centrally and non-centrally provided data resides. Not 
only governments, but also the private sector and citizens play a pivotal role in this 
ecosystem as users and/or producers of data (Budhathoki et al., 2008). In this way, 
data collection and sharing becomes more efficient and inclusive, but the SDIs will 
also be more sensitive to and dependent on each other’s changes, which increases 
the complexity of their governance.  
The proposed governing system framework gives another viewpoint for looking not 
only at SDIs, but also at existing SDI frameworks. For example, the five classical 
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SDI components of Rajabifard, people, data, standards, access network and policy 
(Rajabifard et al., 2002), fit in the governing system framework. Standards, access 
network (or technology) and policy are important enabling structures for data 
sharing between people. However, these SDI components are not always SDI 
enablers, as the case studies in this research point out. Additionally, other SDIs 
such as INSPIRE suffer from overly fixed structures such as standards 
(Borzacchiello et al., 2018), which could provide a risk for its support.  
Analysing the governing system of an SDI with the framework used here seems a 
useful method to better understand the governance and governability of an SDI. 
Two weaknesses are that it does not give insights into causalities and it does not 
encompass external effects, which could have a major influence on SDIs. 
Moreover, with the qualitative method we used, we can only make comparisons 
between rounds within the case study itself. Comparisons between different SDIs 
would appear difficult. By applying the governing system framework with a more 
quantitative approach, such as surveys, the framework could be a useful tool for 
SDI governance benchmarking. 
However, the two case studies in this research show that the combination of 
qualitative analysis and the governing system framework is a valuable tool for 
understanding SDI governance dynamics. With the help of the proposed governing 
system framework, shifts and trends become visible, while the qualitative analysis 
helps to give meaning to these SDI governance dynamics. As these two cases 
were goal-oriented SDIs, the governing system framework must be applied to other 
types of SDIs and SDI contexts in order to provide proof of its full potential. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors would like to thank all persons involved in the interviews and the user 
committee of this project for their time, support and feedback. Furthermore, we 
would like to thank the Netherlands Organisations for Scientific Research 
(Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek: NWO) for making 
this research possible. 
REFERENCES 
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543-571. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032 
Bemelmans-Videc, M.-L., Rist, R. C., & Vedung, E. (1998). Carrots, sticks & 
sermons : policy instruments and their evaluation. New Brunswick, N.J., 
U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers. 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2020, Vol.15, 1-35 
28 
Bongers, F., de Boer, P. J., Van der Vorst, T., & Steur, J. (2019). Evaluatie van 
(het gebruik van) de Risicokaart. Utrecht: Dialogic Innovatie & Interactie  
Borzacchiello, M. T., Boguslawski, R., & Pignatelli, F. (2018). New Directions in 
Digital Government Using INSPIRE-Report from the Workshop at the 
INSPIRE Conference 2017. International Journal of Spatial Data 
Infrastructures Research, 13, 202-222.  
Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Budhathoki, N. R., Bruce, B., & Nedovic-Budic, Z. (2008). Reconceptualizing the 
role of the user of spatial data infrastructure. GeoJournal, 72(3), 149-160. 
doi:10.1007/s10708-008-9189-x 
Coetzee, S., Odijk, M., van Loenen, B., Storm, J., & Stoter, J. (2018). Stakeholder 
analysis of the governance framework of a national SDI dataset – whose 
needs are met in the buildings and address register of the Netherlands? 
International Journal of Digital Earth, 1-19. 
doi:10.1080/17538947.2018.1520930 
Craig, W. (2005). White knights of Spatial Data Infrastructure: The role and 
motivation of key individuals. URISA journal, 16(2), 5-13.  
Crompvoets, J., Vancauwenberghe, G., Ho, S., Masser, I., & De Vries, W. T. 
(2018). Governance of national spatial data infrastructures in Europe. 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 13, 253-285.  
Dang, T. K. P., Visseren-Hamakers, I. J., & Arts, B. (2015). A framework for 
assessing governance capacity: An illustration from Vietnam's forestry 
reforms. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 34(6), 
1154-1174. doi:10.1177/0263774x15598325 
De Man, E. W. H. (2006). Understanding SDI; complexity and institutionalization. 
International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 20(3), 329-343. 
doi:10.1080/13658810500399688 
De Vries, K. G. (2001). Vuurwerkramp Enschede. Brief van de minister van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Den Haag. 
Dessers, E., Crompvoets, J., Janssen, K., Vancauwenberghe, G., Vandenbroucke, 
D., Vanhaverbeke, L., & Van Hootegem, G. (2012). A multidisciplinary 
research framework for analysing the spatial enablement of public sector 
processes. International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 
7, 125-150.  
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The Struggle to Govern the Commons. 
Science, 302(5652), 1907-1912. doi:10.1126/science.1091015 
Duit, A., & Galaz, V. (2008). Governance and Complexity—Emerging Issues for 
Governance Theory. Governance, 21(3), 311-335. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0491.2008.00402.x 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2020, Vol.15, 1-35 
29 
FO MRK projectteam, PinkRoccade, & Geodan. (2003). Model Risicokaart 
Einddocument Functioneel Ontwerp. Den Haag. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of 
structuration: Univ of California Press. 
Grus, L., Crompvoets, J., & Bregt, A. K. (2010). Spatial data infrastructures as 
complex adaptive systems. International Journal of Geographical 
Information Science, 24(3), 439-463. doi:10.1080/13658810802687319 
Hansen, H. S., Hvingel, L., & Schrøder, L. (2013). Open Government Data – A Key 
Element in the Digital Society. In A. Kő, C. Leitner, H. Leitold, & A. Prosser 
(Eds.), Technology-Enabled Innovation for Democracy, Government and 
Governance: Second Joint International Conference on Electronic 
Government and the Information Systems Perspective, and Electronic 
Democracy, EGOVIS/EDEM 2013, Prague, Czech Republic, August 26-28, 
2013, Proceedings, 167-180. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. 
Hood, C. C. (1983). Exploring Government’s Toolshed. In The Tools of 
Government (pp. 1-15). London: Macmillan Education UK. 
Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie. (2013). Scan Risicokaart. Onderzoek op 
hoofdlijnen naar de risicokaart. Den Haag: Inspectie Veiligheid en Justitie. 
Kersbergen, K. V., & Waarden, F. V. (2004). ‘Governance’ as a bridge between 
disciplines: Cross‐disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance 
and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy. European 
Journal of Political Research, 43(2), 143-171. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
6765.2004.00149.x 
Klijn, E.-H. (2008). Governance and Governance Networks in Europe. Public 
Management Review, 10(4), 505-525. doi:10.1080/14719030802263954 
Klijn, E.-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2016). Governance networks in the public 
sector. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Kok, B., & van Loenen, B. (2005). How to assess the success of National Spatial 
Data Infrastructures? Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 
2005(29), 699-717.  
Kooiman, J. (2003). Governing as Governance. London: SAGE. 
Kooiman, J., & Bavinck, M. (2013). Theorizing Governability – The Interactive 
Governance Perspective. In M. Bavinck, R. Chuenpagdee, S. Jentoft, & J. 
Kooiman (Eds.), Governability of Fisheries and Aquaculture: Theory and 
Applications, 9-30. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 
Lance, K. T., Georgiadou, Y., & Bregt, A. K. (2009). Cross-agency coordination in 
the shadow of hierarchy: 'joining up' government geospatial information 
systems. International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 23(2), 
249-269.  
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2020, Vol.15, 1-35 
30 
Masser, I., Rajabifard, A., & Williamson, I. (2008). Spatially enabling governments 
through SDI implementation. International Journal of Geographical 
Information Science, 22(1), 5-20. doi:10.1080/13658810601177751 
Masser, I. A. N. (1999). All shapes and sizes: the first generation of national spatial 
data infrastructures. International Journal of Geographical Information 
Science, 13(1), 67-84. doi:10.1080/136588199241463 
Oosting, C. (2001). De vuurwerkramp: eindrapport. Enschede/Den Haag: 
Commissie Onderzoek Vuurwerkramp. 
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). Public Management Reform. A Comparative 
Analysis: New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian 
State New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rajabifard, A., Feeney, M.-E. F., & Williamson, I. P. (2002). Future directions for 
SDI development. International Journal of Applied Earth Observation and 
Geoinformation, 4(1), 11-22. doi:10.1016/S0303-2434(02)00002-8 
Rajabifard, A., Feeney, M. E., Williamson, I., & Masser, I. (2003). National SDI 
Initiatives. In I. Williamson, A. Rajabifard, & M.-E. F. Feeney (Eds.), 
Developing Spatial Data Infrastructures: From Concept to Reality, 99-114. 
London: Taylor & Francis. 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The New Governance: Governing without Government. 
Political Studies, 44(4), 652-667. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb01747.x 
Rijke, J., Brown, R., Zevenbergen, C., Ashley, R., Farelly, M., Morison, P., & van 
Herk, S. (2012). Fit-for-purpose governance: A framework to make 
adaptive governance operational. Environmental Science & Policy, 22, 73-
84.  
Sewell, W. H. (1992). A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation. 
American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), 1-29. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2781191 
Sjoukema, J.-W., Bregt, A., & Crompvoets, J. (2017). Evolving Spatial Data 
Infrastructures and the Role of Adaptive Governance. ISPRS International 
Journal of Geo-Information, 6(8), 254. Retrieved from 
http://www.mdpi.com/2220-9964/6/8/254 
Teisman, G. R. (2000). Models For Research into Decision-MakingProcesses: On 
Phases, Streams and Decision-Making Rounds. Public Administration, 
78(4), 937-956. doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00238 
UN-GGIM. (2017). National Institutional Arrangements: Instruments, Principles 
and Guidelines. New York: Statistics Division United Nations.  
UN-GGIM. (2018). Integrated Geospatial Information Framework: A Strategic 
Guide To Develop And Strengthen National Geospatial Information 
Management. Part 1: Overarching Strategic Framework. New York: 
Statistics Division United Nations. 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2020, Vol.15, 1-35 
31 
Vancauwenberghe, G. (2013). Coordination within Spatial Data Infrastructures: An 
analysis of exchange and use of geographical information in Flanders. 
(PhD). KU Leuven, Leuven.  
Vancauwenberghe, G., Valečkaitė, K., van Loenen, B., & Donker, F. W. (2018). 
Assessing the Openness of Spatial Data Infrastructures (SDI): Towards a 
Map of Open SDI. International Journal, 13, 88-100.  
Vancauwenberghe, G., & van Loenen, B. (2017). Governance of open spatial data 
infrastructures in Europe. In F. van Schalkwyk, S. G. Verhulst, G. 
Magalhaes, J. Pane, & J. Walker (Eds.), The Social Dynamics of Open 
Data, 63-88: African Minds. 
Welle Donker, F. (2009). Public Sector Geo Web Services: Which Business Model 
Will Pay for a Free Lunch? In J. W. J. B. B. van Loenen, J.A. Zevenbergen 
(Ed.), SDI Convergence. Research, Emerging Trends, and Critical 
Assessment, 35-50. Delft: Optima Grafische Communicatie. 
Welle Donker, F., & van Loenen, B. (2017). How to assess the success of the open 
data ecosystem? International Journal of Digital Earth, 10(3), 284-306. 
doi:10.1080/17538947.2016.1224938 
 
  
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2020, Vol.15, 1-35 
32 
APPENDIX 
Tables showing the coding results per case. First the absolute amount of code 
frequencies per round is shown. Thereafter, two indicators are shown. The first 
indicator is calculated by calculating a percentage of a code compared to the total 
amount of codes per round. This calculation is done for both rounds and then this 
percentage is subtracted from each other, resulting in the percentage shown in the 
column ‘relative difference between rounds’. When the difference is more than 
0.5% or -0.5%, the number is shown in bold. The second indicator is calculated in 
the same way, but then the percentage is calculated compared to the total amount 
of codes within a round per category (e.g. ‘action’). Again, these percentages are 
subtracted, resulting in the indicator shown in the column ‘relative difference within 
category’. When the difference is more than 1.5% or -1.5% the number is shown 
in bold.  
Table 1: Code frequencies of the Risk Map 
Category Code Attribute 
Risk 
Map 
Round 1 
Risk 
Map 
Round 2 
Relative 
difference 
between 
rounds 
Relative 
difference 
within 
category 
Action Collaboration Present 35 26 -1.8% -12.3% 
    Lacking 17 23 -0.4% -1.2% 
  Coordination Present 11 36 0.8% 8.9% 
    Lacking 40 58 -0.7% -1.1% 
  Leadership Present 9 15 -0.1% 0.6% 
    Lacking 3 20 0.7% 7.1% 
  Self-organisation Present 25 40 -0.3% 1.0% 
    Lacking 5 1 -0.4% -3.0% 
Image Collaborative Aligned 21 43 0.2% 0.0% 
    Unaligned 30 33 -1.0% -5.8% 
  Feedback Negative 39 67 -0.2% -2.6% 
    Positive 23 53 0.5% 1.2% 
  Goal/vision Explicit 61 71 -1.9% -11.0% 
    Individual 18 97 3.0% 12.3% 
  Satisfaction Negative 31 80 1.1% 3.4% 
    Positive 16 45 0.8% 2.5% 
Interaction Bottom-up Interference 7 25 0.6% 7.7% 
    Interplay 32 75 0.8% 13.0% 
    Intervention 4 8 0.0% 0.8% 
  Top-down Interference 0 9 0.4% 5.1% 
    Interplay 30 43 -0.6% -3.3% 
    Intervention 35 16 -2.3% -23.3% 
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Instrument Detector Information 10 32 0.7% 6.4% 
    Organisation 28 67 0.8% 10.3% 
    Rule 17 5 -1.2% -5.9% 
  Effector Information 43 50 -1.3% -2.2% 
    Organisation 74 123 -0.6% 8.8% 
    Rule 52 17 -3.7% -17.4% 
SDI 
qualities Data provision Bad 12 12 -0.5% -13.6% 
    Good 9 8 -0.4% -11.0% 
  
Data 
quality/availability Bad 15 40 0.6% 3.6% 
    Good 4 13 0.3% 2.9% 
  Use Non use 2 15 0.5% 8.5% 
    Use 9 33 0.8% 9.6% 
Structures 
Roles and 
responsibilities Enabling 57 112 0.4% -0.7% 
    Constraining 43 69 -0.4% -2.5% 
  Budget resources Enabling 11 28 0.4% 0.6% 
    Constraining 6 37 1.2% 3.0% 
  Culture Enabling 2 0 -0.2% -0.5% 
    Constraining 6 5 -0.3% -0.9% 
  
Knowledge 
resources Enabling 12 37 0.7% 1.5% 
    Constraining 9 19 0.1% 0.0% 
  Law Enabling 54 70 -1.3% -5.1% 
    Constraining 13 45 1.0% 2.2% 
  Ownership Enabling 12 29 0.3% 0.5% 
    Constraining 8 23 0.4% 0.8% 
  Political capital Enabling 20 43 0.3% 0.2% 
    Constraining 6 23 0.6% 1.3% 
  Social capital Enabling 1 15 0.6% 1.6% 
    Constraining 0 2 0.1% 0.2% 
  Standards Enabling 26 9 -1.8% -5.5% 
    Constraining 9 21 0.2% 0.3% 
  Support Enabling 14 37 0.5% 1.0% 
    Constraining 8 50 1.7% 4.1% 
  Technology Enabling 28 24 -1.3% -4.2% 
    Constraining 23 49 0.3% 0.2% 
  Time resources Enabling 3 11 0.3% 0.6% 
    Constraining 2 24 1.0% 2.4% 
  Trust Enabling 1 7 0.2% 0.6% 
    Constraining 18 22 -0.5% -1.9% 
Total     1159 2110     
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Table 2: Code frequencies of the New Map of the Netherlands 
Category Code Attribute 
New Map 
Round 1 
New 
Map 
Round 2 
Relative 
difference 
between 
rounds 
Relative 
difference 
within 
category 
Action Collaboration Present 13 32 0.7% 1.1% 
    Lacking 9 22 0.5% 0.7% 
  Coordination Present 15 10 -1.0% -12.0% 
    Lacking 5 22 0.9% 5.2% 
  Leadership Present 9 29 1.0% 4.1% 
    Lacking 1 2 0.0% -0.1% 
  Self-organisation Present 34 83 1.8% 2.5% 
    Lacking 3 4 -0.1% -1.4% 
Image Collaborative Aligned 7 5 -0.4% -2.4% 
    Unaligned 10 43 1.8% 7.1% 
  Feedback Negative 25 32 -0.6% -4.4% 
    Positive 33 40 -1.0% -6.4% 
  Goal/vision Explicit 35 38 -1.3% -8.1% 
    Individual 13 77 3.7% 15.4% 
  Satisfaction Negative 24 55 1.0% 2.9% 
    Positive 35 52 -0.4% -4.0% 
Interaction Bottom-up Interference 8 12 -0.1% 1.4% 
    Interplay 30 45 -0.3% 5.2% 
    Intervention 2 0 -0.2% -2.8% 
  Top-down Interference 1 2 0.0% 0.7% 
    Interplay 16 32 0.4% 11.1% 
    Intervention 15 5 -1.3% -15.6% 
Instrument Detector Information 7 21 0.6% 9.0% 
    Organisation 1 34 2.2% 23.6% 
    Rule 1 0 -0.1% -0.9% 
  Effector Information 34 44 -0.8% 1.8% 
    Organisation 63 35 -4.6% -30.1% 
    Rule 8 5 -0.5% -3.4% 
SDI 
qualities Data provision Bad 4 22 1.0% 12.1% 
    Good 32 22 -2.1% -10.3% 
  
Data 
quality/availability Bad 12 20 0.0% 4.3% 
    Good 29 15 -2.2% -12.8% 
  Use Non use 1 16 1.0% 10.3% 
    Use 47 49 -1.9% -3.6% 
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Structures 
Roles and 
responsibilities Enabling 30 31 -1.2% -3.7% 
    Constraining 13 32 0.7% 1.7% 
  Budget resources Enabling 25 22 -1.3% -3.8% 
    Constraining 29 18 -2.0% -5.7% 
  Culture Enabling 1 3 0.1% 0.2% 
    Constraining 1 7 0.4% 0.9% 
  
Knowledge 
resources Enabling 15 15 -0.6% -2.0% 
    Constraining 3 6 0.1% 0.1% 
  Law Enabling 4 4 -0.2% -0.5% 
    Constraining 10 15 -0.1% -0.4% 
  Ownership Enabling 11 4 -0.9% -2.7% 
    Constraining 3 15 0.7% 1.7% 
  Political capital Enabling 9 11 -0.3% -0.8% 
    Constraining 4 15 0.6% 1.4% 
  Social capital Enabling 5 30 1.5% 3.8% 
    Constraining 0 3 0.2% 0.5% 
  Standards Enabling 31 22 -1.9% -5.6% 
    Constraining 14 35 0.8% 1.9% 
  Support Enabling 27 69 1.7% 3.9% 
    Constraining 16 63 2.5% 6.2% 
  Technology Enabling 38 39 -1.6% -4.8% 
    Constraining 9 20 0.4% 0.8% 
  Time resources Enabling 8 20 0.5% 1.1% 
    Constraining 15 28 0.2% 0.3% 
  Trust Enabling 1 7 0.4% 0.9% 
    Constraining 3 30 1.7% 4.4% 
Total     907 1489     
 
